Convergence, rationality and accuracy in South African consensus forecasts by Samouilhan, N L
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
CONVERGENCE. RATIONALITY AND ACCURACY IN 
SOUTH AFRICAN CONSENSUS FORECASTS 
N. L. Samouilhan t 
Abstract 
The average values of numerous forecasts about South African economic variables are often calculated to give a summary measure of all the forecasters' views. This mean 
forecast is found to increasingly represent the information held by the various forecasters 
as the forecast horizon declines. The mean forecast is also tound to systematically 
underpredict large actual outcomes and overpredict low actual outcomes at long forecast 
horizons, with the opposite behaviour being found at short horizons. The mean forecasts 
are found to be rational at all horizons and overall. Forecasts of growth in ODP do not 
become monotonically more accurate as the forecast horizon declines, though forecasts of 
inflation do. The mean forecast is shown to be more accurate at all horizons than two 
extrapolation models. No relationship is found between the degree of dispersion of the 
forecasts around the mean and the means's accuracy for forecasts of both variables. 
Keywords: Forecasting, Rationality, Accuracy, Forecast horizon 
1. Introduction 
As in all countries, many South African institutions require estimates of the future value 
of certain economic variables in order to operate. The government, for example, requires 
forecasts of the coming years' GOP growth for the estimation of tax receipts, and 
exporting companies need forecasts of the Rand/Dollar exchange rate for planning 
purposes. To address this infomlation need, economists provide forecasts of key 
economic variables for the coming year. Often, the forecasts of many different 
economists are averaged in order to arrive at a mean 'consensus' forecast. 
This paper investigates some aspects of this 'consensus' forecast. Firstly, the paper looks 
at whether or not it is appropriate to interpret the mean forecast as a consensus forecast in 
South Afnca. The mean could represent nothing more than a simple statistical construct if 
the forecasts are widely distributed in an asynunetric pattern. Alternatively the mean 
would represent a valuable summary of the forecasters' views if the individual forecasts 
are closely distributed around it and if they all move closely together. Stated differently 
and looked at dynamically, a convergence by all the forecasts over the horizon towards a 
certain value would imply that the mean increasingly represents a sununary of the 
heterogeneous infomlation held by the individual forecasters. The paper investigates the 
behaviour of the forecasts around this 'mean forecast' over the forecast horizon for each 
year in order to observe the summary ability of the mean forecast. 
Secondly, the paper explores whether this 'consensus' forecast is an accurate and rational 
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predictor of the actual outcome for different forecast horizons and different years. While 
it is impossible for forecasters to accurately know the inherently uncertain future, they 
should at the very least not consistently over- or under-predict the future value. Each 
horizon forecast should, in theory, be an unbiased predictor of the future, being accurate 
on average. Evidence of systemic under- or over-prediction of the variable implies 
irrational behaviour by the forecaster (provided of course that the goal of the forecasting 
is to be correct, which may not always be the case) and provides useful infom1ation to 
users of such forecasts. 
Forecasters make their best estimates of the future values of variables based on limited 
information of the future. However, as the forecast horizon declines more and more 
infomlation about the future value of the variable becomes available. It would therefore 
be expected that forecast revisions based on more information should be more accurate 
than those based on less information. At the very least, rational forecasters shouldn't 
become more inaccurate as the forecast horizon declines. This infomlation rationality 
aspect is the third characteristic tested in the paper. 
Another useful inquiry is whether the forecast mean, and hence South African 
forecasters, provide useful information about the future value of the variable under 
investigation. This value-added of economist knowledge is the fourth aspect tested; it is 
done so by evaluating the forecasting record of the mean forecast against that of two 
simple pure extrapolation forecasts. 
Lastly, the relationship between the dispersion of the forecasters around a mean forecast 
and the accuracy of that mean forecast is investigated. It would be expected that if there 
is a high level of agreement amongst economists on a certain future value of a variabJe 
then there should be a higher probability of it being correct. If so, users of forecasts could 
use the degree of forecast dispersion as a guide to the likely accuracy of the forecast 
value. This expected relationship is tested by investigating the relationship between the 
mean forecasts' accuracy and the variance of the forecasts around it. 
2. Data 
The data used in this study is drawn from the annual Beeld 'Economist of the Year' 
competition jointly run by the Stellenbosch GSB and the Beeld newspaper. In the 
competition various diverse forecasters from the public, private and academic spheres 
forecast ten key economic variables for the coming year, such as the growth in South 
African real GDP for the full year and the inflation rate for the full year. For the 
competition each forecaster is asked in January to make initial forecasts for the respective 
year for each of the ten variables. For each subsequent month until November each 
forecaster is sent the forecasts given by all the other forecasters the previous month, and 
asked for a revised set of forecasts. In the first few months of the following year the 
lowest total squared error between each economist's monthly forecasts and the actual is 
calculated; with the forecasts made at the beginning of the year being weighted more 
heavily than those made at the end of the year. The forecaster with the lowest weighted 
mean square error is named as the Beeld "Economist of the Year". 
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The data set drawn from this competition contains the forecasts of two variables for nine 
years (1994 to 2002), with forecasts from between 14 and 28 forecasters. The data set 
contains all the forecasts made at different horizons; the first in January and the last in 
November for each of the two variables for every respective year. For testing only the 
mean forecast made in each period, the data set thus contains 9 years of 11 observations 
for two different series, for a total of two series of 99 observations. When evaluating the 
full sample with the entire set of individual forecaster's values, the sample increases to 
4556 observations. The two variables under examination in this study are the forecasts of 
the percentage growth of South African real GDP for the full year and the forecasts of the 
average inflation rate for the full year. 1 
This paper follows the methodology of Keane and Runkle (1990) by evaluating the 
forecasts against the unrevised GDP and inflation figures2. The actuals that the forecasts 
are measured against are the figures released in the South African Reserve Bank's 
(March) Quarterly Bulletin the year after the period being forecast. For instance, the 
figure used to evaluate the GDP forecasts made in 1994 is the figure released in the 
SARB's 1995 March Quarterly Bulletin for GDP in 1994. Subsequent revisions to the 
1994 GDP are ignored as the tests of rationality and accuracy depend critically on 
knowing exactly what the economists tried to forecast and what information they had 
when they made those forecasts. Using the revised data essentially changes the rules of 
the game, making evaluation of the forecasts inconsistent. 
The dataset used was almost entirely complete, missing only 49 observations out of 4556 
(1.08% of the total). The missing data was dealt with as follows. If a data entry was 
missing for a particular forecaster the average value of both the previous and next 
forecasts from that forecaster was used. If the series was missing the initial forecasts, i.e. 
missing the first n forecasts, then the first known forecast was assumed to be the missing 
forecasts. Similar methodology was used to complete series missing the last n 
observations: the last known forecast of that forecaster was assumed to be the missing 
forecasts. 
It was decided to evaluate the forecasts of growth in GDP and the average inflation rate 
for the year because they meet two key conditions. Firstly, they are two of the most 
important economic variables whose future values are understood and widely sought. 
Secondly, compared to other well known economic variables such as the Rand/Dollar 
exchange rate, they are far 'better behaved' over the sample period. This relative 
'stability' is important as the difference amongst forecasts is affected by two principal 
components: the variability amongst the forecasters and the variability around the 
forecast variable. By focusing on variables with the most 'stability' the differences 
amongst the forecasters can be more clearly investigated. 
1 These are the variables defined as code 6006Z and 7032A in the SARB Quarterly Bulletin, respectively. 
2 The CPI figures are never revised during the relevant period under examination, and as such this only 
affects the GOP figures. 
3 
Un
v
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
3. A 'Consensus' Forecast? 
A problem facing users of forecasting infonnation is that there are very many forecasters 
whose forecasts usually differ. To save time and effort, many users of such information 
rely simply on the average forecast as an aggregator of the infonnation provided by the 
forecasters. Additionally, the media often only present the average forecast when 
discussing expected future values; the Reuters poll of economists is a good example of 
this. However, it needs to be investigated whether consumers of such infonnation are 
correct in treating the mean forecast as a convenient summation of the views of 
forecasters. If it is a good infonnation summary then the average forecast can indeed be 
meaningfully interpreted as a 'consensus' forecast. Altematively, the mean could simply 
be a statistical construct, the forecasts being widely and asymmetrically distributed 
around the mean and behaving in an erratic manner not shown in the movement of the 
mean. 
If we look at it dynamically, a convergence by all the forecasts over the horizon towards 
a certain value would imply that the mean increasingly becomes a useful summary of the 
heterogeneous infonnation held by the individual forecasters. Theoretically, if there is a 
point where all forecasters fully converge on a certain value the mean would be a perfect 
summary of the infonnation provided by all the forecasters. In reality, forecasters never 
come to a full agreement on a certain value, even towards the end of the forecast period. 
If, however, it can be shown that forecasters converge towards a value as the horizon 
declines then the mean forecast can be viewed as an increasingly appropriate summary of 
the individual forecasts. 
This definition of consensus is the dominant view in the forecasting literature. McNees 
(1997) and Zamowitz (1985), for instance, used this definition of consensus to test US 
forecasts, finding growing consensus amongst forecasters. However, while convergence 
on a certain value is the most frequent interpretation of a growing consensus, it is 
certainly not the only view. The literature provides another three definitions of consensus. 
Lahiri and Teigland (1987) and Schnader and Stekler (1991) propose a less strict 
definition of consensus. Here, a consensus amongst forecasters exists if the distributions 
of the forecasts are unimodal, symmetric around the mean and at least as peaked as the 
nonnal distribution. This is a far broader definition of consensus, requiring a general 
agreement around rather than exact concurrence on a certain value. Gregory and Yetman 
(2001) propose yet another definition of forecast consensus. In their view a consensus 
exists if the individual forecasters only differ from a latent, common variable by an 
orthogonal component with a zero mean. Finally, Gregory, Smith and Yetman (2001) 
hold that forecasters are in consensus if their forecasts are insignificantly different from 
the forecast mean. 
Unfortunately, all three of those definitions of consensus require more observations than 
are available in this data set to be tested rigorously. For specific petiods, for example, the 
dataset only contains between 13 and 30 observations (forecasts), making tests of 
nommlity impossible. The test for consensus in this paper will therefore use the dominant 
strict definition of convergence: whether or not individual forecasters are converging on a 
certain variable as the forecast horizon declines. While this does not allow us to say 
whether or not consensus exists at a certain forecast horizon, it does allows us to talk of a 
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certain forecast period exhibiting greater consensus and hence aggregation of the 
forecasters' private views than another forecast horizon. 
As explained by Gregory and Yetman (2004), there are three main reasons why it should 
be expected that such convergence over the horizon will occur. Firstly, there is less 
uncertainty with respect to the forecast variable as the horizon decreases. As the year 
progresses information regarding factors that affect the relevant variables, such as the 
level of the Rand/Dollar or the inflation figures for past months, become known with 
more certainty. This leads to more uniformity of the information held by forecasters 
whereupon their forecasts are based. Secondly, forecasters have the ability to see other 
forecasters' forecasts and take this information into account when revising their own 
forecasts. In the competition that the dataset is drawn from all forecasters receive the 
other forecasters' values from the previous revision before they make their next 
submission, so this could be a factor. Lastly, new information that affects the variable 
under consideration is available to all, and this common information is taken into account 
universally. Provided economists believe that this new information affects the variables 
in the same way the information will lead them to revise their forecasts in the same 
direction. 
Operationally, the strict definition of a growing consensus is tested by examining whether 
a significant relationship exists between the horizon and the variance of the sample. 
Formally, we estimate: 
(I) 
where aL is the variance in year k and horizon t. 
Growing convergence amongst the forecasters would require the horizon coefficient,Pk.l , 
in equation (l) to be both positive and significant, with the forecast horizon running at 
monthly intervals from November (t:;;;; I) to January (t= 11). An insignificant horizon 
coefficient would imply that there was no growing convergence amongst the forecasts, 
and a coefficient that was both significant and negative would imply a growing 
divergence. In addition, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is an indication of the 
rate of convergence/divergence of the various forecasters on a consensus forecast. It 
would also be expected that the intercept be both significant and positive; it is unrealistic 
to expect forecasters to come to universal agreement on an exact value, even at the end of 
the forecast horizon. 
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TABLE 1: Average Variance Regressed on Forecast Horizon, 
GDP Forecasts 1994 to 2002 
Year Prob(F~Stat) R2 a k ,/ I 13k.1 Behaviour II 
1994 0.045 .374. 0.01 (0.25) 0.01 (2.32) Convergence 
1f--19-9-S----+--0-.-00-8--+--.5-S-4--r-0--.0-2-'-(2-.60) I 0.01 (3.34) Convergence 
1996 0.000 .774 0.01 (1.18) 1 0.01 (5.55) Convergence----11 
1997 0.005 .541 0.02 (1.64) I 0.01 (3.57) Convergence 
1998 0.941 .001 0.19 (3,48) I 0.00 (0.07) No RelatioHnhil 
1999 0.000 .960 -0.01 (0.5) 0.04 (14.8) Convergenc 
2000 0.002 .666 0.04 (.033) I 0.01 (4.23) Convergence 
112001 0.009 .543 0.16 (7.53) I -0.01 (-3.27) I Divergence 11-2~0-O";"'2---+--0-.0-0-0--+---.7-4-1-+---0-.0-6~(7.26) I 0.01 (5.08) -_. Convergence 
Avg 0.000 .855 0.06(5.88) [ 0.01 (7.i8) Convergence 
~ 
t-statistics in brackets after coefficients 
TABLE 2: Average Variance Regressed on Forecast Horizon, 
Inflation Forecasts 1994 to 2002 
.~ Year Prob(F-Stat) • R2 (1.k,1 13 Behavio 
1994 0.355 .095 0.19 (2.70) -0.01 (-0.9) No relationsh 
1995 0.008 .555 0.26 (6.12) 0.02 (3.35) Convergence 
1996 0.109 .259 0.81 (4.61) -0.04 (-1. 7) Divergence 
1997 0.000 .834 -0.06 (-2.2) 0.02 (6.73) Convergence 
= 1998 I 0.000 .810 -0.00 (-Q.23) I 0.02 (6.20) Convergence 
I 
._._. 
1999 0.000 .729 0.02 (0.62) 0.03 (4.92) I Convergence 
2000 0.000 .903 -0.07 (-2.05) 0.04 (9.16) +-Converg(;;. 
2001 0.001 .683 0.05 (2.23) 0.01 (4,40) • Convergence 
2002 0.000 .735 1.35 (18.2) 0.01 (-4.9) I Convergence 
--
Avg 0.018 .475 0.02 (18.45) 0.01 (2.85) I Convergence 
Note: 
t-statistics in brackets after coefficients 
There is strong evidence that the forecasts converge for nine of the eleven years for the 
GDP forecasts, although at very different rates (see Table 1). In ] 995 for example, 
forecasters converge on a 'consensus' at a far slower rate (.01) than in 1999 (.04). In 
addition, in one year, 1998, there is no evidence either way for convergence or divergence 
of the GDP forecasts. In another, 2001, there is evidence of a divergence of the GDP 
forecasts, implying a growing disagreement over the variable's value by the forecasters. 
In general though, the years show a positive relationship between the forecast horizon 
and the level of variance. 
The forecasts for inflation show a similar pattern of general convergence both overall and 
for nine of the eleven years, though, as found with the GDP forecasts, at very different 
rates. In addition, again as found with the GDP forecasts, there is evidence of divergence 
in one year (1996) and no evidence either way for another (1994). It should be noted 
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however that the years where non-convergence is found among the inflation forecasts are 
not the same years where non-convergence is found among the GOP forecasts. 
This overall pattern of growing convergence is widely found internationally. Amongst 
others, Gregory and Yetman (2004), Batchelor (1990), Spiro (1989) and Zarnowitz 
(1984) found convergence in US forecasts. 
In summary, even though we have not tested whether or not the mean forecast is a 
consensus forecast, we can say the following regarding it: In general, as the forecast 
horizon declines the mean forecast increasingly represents a useful summary of the views 
held by the forecasters. As such, users of such information can increasingly rely on the 
mean as an appropriate aggregator of the heterogeneous infonnation held by the different 
forecasters. 
4. Aspects of the Mean Forecast 
4.1 Horizon Dynamics 
While the mean forecast can be increasingly interpreted as a useful summary of the 
forecasters' views by users of such information, it obviously needs to be tested how 
accurate this mean forecast really is. Using the mean as a measure that captures the 
available forecast information so as to minimise costs (in its broadest term) is of no use if 
the mean forecast is generally inaccurate. As an initial evaluation of the accuracy of the 
mean forecasts the comparison of the Box and Whisker plots of January forecasts to the 
November forecasts (Figure 1, below) provides some key initial insights about the 
accuracy of the forecasts over the forecast horizon. 
Broadly speaking, the spread of the forecasts tends to narrow as the forecast horizon 
declines; an aspect that concurs with earlier evidence of a growing consensus. In 
addition, the mean of the forecasts also tends to move towards the actuals as the horizon 
declines. Forecasters appear to be interpreting new information about the GOP correctly 
as the year progresses and become increasingly accurate as the forecast horizon declines. 
(This relationship between the forecast horizon and forecast accuracy is considered in 
more detail later on) 
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FIGURE 1: Initial (January) and Final (November) GDP and Inflation Forecasts, 
1994 to 2002 
Inllallon: January 
::c. ~ ...  
'1: y 
Innatioo: N~ 
:······· 8 -,- og I 
.......... . ..... .. ... -L ... 8 ow' ..... .. ... ... .. ................ ... .. 
:.. . ....... ... r:l. ' ..... . .. . .. ... ... . 
l[... r 
2 ~---,~--,~---,~--,~-1-,-~--,~--=--~--, -~-2--~L----I~--,~---,~--,~-,-,-_--,~--_---~-, -~-2--~ 
GDI>: January GD P: NOlAlfrtJel' 
.11·· 
·2 "---------------- ------' .2 "-----------------------------' 
1994 1985 lU96 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1994 1995 1996 1991 1996 1999 2000 200 ' 2002 
Note: The box represents I standard deviation above and below the forecast mean, 95% of the forecasts 
thus lie within the box limits . The whiskers represent the highest and lowest forecasts, the small square the 
mean consensus forecast and the solid triangle the actual value of the forecast variable. 
For the GDP forecasts the initial January forecasts are, in general, not very accurate at all. 
For five of the nine years the entire spread of the January forecasts fails to include the 
actual. In 1994 and 2000, however, the mean January forecasts are remarkable close to 
the actual; and in 1999 the actual is within one standard deviation of the mean, though 
from a very wide spread. Lastly, in no single year is the actual completely unexpected; in 
each year the actual falls inside the full spread of the forecasts made in November. In 
fact, with the exception of 1995, the actual always falls within one standard deviation of 
the end of year mean forecast. 
The January forecasts of inflation are also not very accurate on the whole. The entire 
spread of forecasts fails to include the actual for four of the nine years. The actual 
forecast was, however, very close to the mean for 1996, 1997 and 2001. As with the GDP 
forecasts, the actual falls within the complete spread of the November forecasts for every 
single year, in this case always within one standard deviation of the mean forecast. 
8 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
4.2 Forecast Rationality 
One of the major questions this paper seeks to address is whether the forecasts are 
rational. In testing for this the paper follows the interpretation of the rational expectations 
literature in defining rationality to mean that rational expectations are exactly the 
mathematical conditional expectations inferred by the model (Bonham and Cohen 2000), 
a widely accepted definition of rationality associated with John Muth (1961). 
Before evaluating the forecasts though, two qualifications about the results of the 
rationality test have to be made. The first is that, as Bonham and Cohen (2000) point out, 
we cannot infer characteristics about the rationality of individual forecasters by 
investigating the rationality of consensus forecasts because of aggregation bias. This 
aggregation bias is the difference between the parameter estimates of the average forecast 
and the average of all the parameter estimates obtained from the analysis of individual 
forecasters. The second caveat is that the rationality test assumes that the objective of 
forecasters is to be as accurate as possible. This may not always be the case; Lomant 
(2002), for instance, observes that forecasters may use their forecasts to difrerentiate 
themselves and influence beliefs about their abilities. 
The first and most important question of the mean forecast when evaluating rationality is 
whether or not it is consistently too optimistic or pessimistic. While the visual plots 
suggest that there is no apparent systematic under- or over-prediction of GDP or inflation 
it can be tested formally whether the mean forecast is indeed an unbiased predictor of the 
actual. Formally, the relation between an unbiased forecast and the actual is: 
(2) 
where AT is the actual value of the variable known at time T, FT-t,T is the consensus 
forecast of the variable for period ending T made at period T-t, t is the forecast horizon, 
and h-t the information set available to the forecasters at time T-t. 
Operationally, we test the above fomlulation of unbiasedness of the forecasts by 
estimating the following model and testing the joint unbiased hypothesis that q = 0 and 
Pt = 1: 
(3) 
Using this formulation, a value for q of 0 would imply that there was no overall under or 
over prediction of the relevant variable, ilTespective of the actual. A value for PI of 1 
would imply that there was no actual-dependant inaccuracy on the part of the forecasters. 
Both are required for the forecasts to be unbiased. 
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4.2.1 An Estimation Problem 
A problem, as stated previously by Swidler and Ketcher (1990), Hansen and Hodrick 
(1980) and Brown and Maital (1981), is that ordinary-least-squares (OLS) estimation of 
equation (3) may be inappropriate due to serial correlation of the error tenns, violating a 
key assumption of OLS estimation. Serial correlation of the error tenns would be 
expected in this sample as the forecasters are unaware until after period T what their 
forecast errors are for all their previous forecasts made at periods T-t. For instance, the 
forecast error made in Febmary 1994 is likely to be strongly correlated with the forecast 
error made in January 1994 as forecasters will not know the magnitude of both errors 
until the actual 1994 GDP figure is released at the beginning of the following year. 
Adding to this predisposition for serial correlation is that the forecasts are often not 
revised from one period to the next. Estimating equation (3) for the full sample using 
OLS will still generate unbiased estimators forC{ andp, but have inefficient standard 
errors, making accurate inference impossible. As 
Heteroscedasticity-and-Autocorrelation-Consistent (HAC) 
calculated (shown below the nonnal OLS estimates). 
such, the Newey-West 
standard errors were 
However, serial correlation and heteroscedasticity are not expected to be present when 
testing the rationality of forecasts made at certain horizons, snch as for the January 
forecasts for example. There is no reason to expect a correlation between, say, the 
January 1994 error and the January 1995 error; and no reason to expect the accuracy in 
January 1994 to be systematically different from the accuracy in January 19953. 
Tables 3 and 4, below, show the results of the estimation of equation (3) for both the 
inflation and the GDP forecasts. These coefficients, along with the other statistics in the 
table, are explained in the sections that follow. 
J Statistical testing confimled this: neither of the two series showed evidence of serial con"elation or 
heterosecdasticity at any horizon at the 5 % significance level. 
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TABLE 3: GDP Forecasts Rationality Tests 
Bv Horizon 
Horizon, T·t q r PI 
! January, 11 033 (0.34) 0.76 (-0.63) 
, February, 10 0.43 (0.95) 0.72 (-0.73) 
March,9 0.40 (0~42) 0.71 (-0.79) 
..... 
~1,8 0.35 (0.35) 0.74 (~0.69) 
, 7 -0.02 (-0.03) 0.93 (-0.20) 
June, 6 -0.22 (-0.32) 1.07(0.14) 
July, 5 -0.26 (-0.46) 1.03 (0.33) 
AUlnlst, 4 -0.24 (-0.62) I 1.08 ( 0.50) 
September, 3 -0.27 (.0.78) i 1.13(0.91) 
October, 2 -0.21 (-0.59) 1.12 (0.80) 
I November, 1 -0.19 (-1.24) 1.08(1.38) 
Full Sample 0.02 (0.14) 0.93 (-0.90) 
HAC Standard (0.08) 
I 
(-1.16) i £"ors Ad}. Figure 
TABLE 4: Inflation Forecasts Rationality Tests 
Bv Horizon 
Horizon, T·t q Pt 
January, 11 3.52 ( 1.62) 0.55 (-1.40) 
! February, 10 3.33 ( 1.53) 0.58 (-1.35) 
March,9 2.21 ( 1.11) 0.72 (-1.03) 
i April,8 1.95 ( 1.04) 0.74 (-1.03) 
i -
II May, 7 1.72 ( 0.92) 0.76 (-0.98) 
June, 6 1.23 (0.78) 0.82 (-0.79) 
July. 5 0.52 ( 0.37) 0.92 (-0.39) 
August, 4 0.05 (0.53) 0.98 (-0.13) 
September, 3 -0.39 (-0.56) 1.00 (0.52) 
October, 2 -0.37 (-1.57) 
.. 
1.04 (1.35) 
November, 1 -0.12 ( 0.87) 1.00 (0.42) 
Full Sample 1.44 (3.16)," i 0.81 (-0.92) 
HAC Siandard (3.37)''' I (-1.48) Errors Ad;_ F'iJ!ure 
Notes for Tables 3 and 4: 
n: number of observations in sample 
R2 MSE Unbiased' n 
.372 0.738 0.552 9 
.357 0.759 0.575 9 
.364 0.80] 0.844 9 
---' -9-~ 
.366 0.778 0.733 
~-
.506 0.554 0.296 9 
.668 0.355 0.185 9 
.749 0.266 0.l63 9 
.,- 9 ~--, 
.865 0.145 0.226 
.891 0.123 0.430 9 
.884 0.131 0.418 9 
.976 0.030 0.960 9 
.603 2.67' 99 
i 
(1.33) 
R2 MSE U b' d'i'! nlase 'n 
.305 2.77 1.49 I 9 
.336 2.56 1.32 9 
.516 1.63 0.87 9 
i .571 l.4i-- 0.57 9 II 
.600 • 1.26 0.48 I 9 
.663 1.02 0.32 9 I[ 
.769 0.65 0.09 9 
.868 0.37 0.08 9 
.947 0.15 0.15 9 
.993 0.02 1.66 9 
--
.997 0.01 2.34 9 
.645 5.03'" 99 
(1.96) I 
t-statistics in brackets after coefficients. Values calculated for a 1= 0 and p, = 1, respectively 
Unbiasedif' : F-stat of Joint Wald test for at =0, P, =1 in eq. AT ::: at + PIFTt,T + I1T-t,T 
*** significant at the 1 % level 
** significant at the 5% level 
* significant at the 10% level 
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4.2.2 Systemic Biasedness 
The estimated coefficients of the horizon forecasts display an interesting pattem. 
Generally speaking, we can separate both the GDP and inflation forecasts into two broad 
periods: a period where forecasters are overly cautious and anchor their forecasts to a 
historical mean and a period where they overreact and take extreme positions. 
Figure 2 (below) aids in explaining the behaviour of the forecasts over the forecast 
horizon. From January to May for the GDP forecasts and January to August for the 
Inflation forecasts it is found that PI < 1 and q > O. Forecasters tend to systematically 
underpredict high levels of inflation (GDP growth) and overpredict low levels of inflation 
(GDP grO\vth) in the beginning of the year. Stated differently, when the actual inflation 
rate is low, forecasters will initially forecast values that are too high (Consider Pt. D in 
Fig 2). If the actual inflation is high, then forecasters will behave as if they are at Pt C in 
Fig 2; they will forecast values that are systematically too low. 
This 'cautious' period could be present because forecasters lack sufficient information at 
the beginning of the year and will forecast Inflation (GDP growth) values that are not too 
far from the average value of Inflation (GDP growth) in the past, just to be prudent and 
keep credibility. Essentially, when having to forecast in an information-poor period 
forecasters revert to mean values, using them as an anchor that their forecasts are 
contingent upon. 
Conversely, it is found that from June to November for GDP and September to October 
for Inflation PI > 1 and q < O. The evidence suggests that in the latter part of the year 
forecasters tend to systematically overpredict high levels of inflation (GDP growth) 
and underpredict low levels of inflation (GDP growth). In reference to Fig. 2, when the 
actual inflation rate is high, forecasters will in the latter part of the year forecast values 
that are too high (Pt. A). If the actual inflation is low, then forecasters will behave as if 
they are at Pt. B; they will forecast values that are systematically too low in the final 
months of the year. A possible explanation for this is that forecasters are overreacting to 
past information regarding Inflation (GDP growth) as it becomes known later on in the 
year. A further reason might be a function of the competition from where the data is 
drawn; forecasters could be taking extreme positions in order to better their chances of 
winning the competition4. 
4 If a forecaster pal1icipating in the competition wishes to 'win' the forecasting of a cel1ain vaJiable, in the 
sense of being the closest to it, a certain strategy is to take an extreme position on the variable. with 
extreme being a value significantly above or below what all the other participating forecasters are expected 
to forecast for the variable this time round, with the hope that everyone else will severely underlover 
forecast it. Forecasting a similar value to all the other forecasters might be the safest, in that it minimises 
the risk of being wrong, but it removes the chance of being the closest forecaster of that variable. 
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FIGURE 2: Systemic Under and Over Prediction of the Actual 
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4.3 Information Rationality: Revisions and Accuracy 
A rational consensus forecasts implies another feature beyond unbiasedness. If the mean 
forecast is a rational processor of information and llses all available information available 
then the mean forecast made at time T-t must take into consideration an information set 
that contains all previous information sets. It would consequently be expected that the 
forecasts will become more accurate as the forecast horizon declines as the forecasters 
gain more and more information; allowing them to make more and more accurate 
forecasts. Formally, this aspect of rationality requires: 
(4) 
with}?:: 0 
This requirement of increasing accuracy of the forecasts can easily be tested using the 
dataset; the Beeld competition allows forecasters to revise their forecasts each month 
from January until November. 
The Mean Squared Error (MSE) was used to gauge the relative accuracy of the forecast 
revisions; it is the measure of accuracy that is most frequently used to evaluate forecast 
accuracy in the literature. It is defined as: 
MSE=------ (5) 
n 
where A, is the actual value of the forecast variable for period T, FT-, is the forecast value 
for respective variable and n is the number of years over which the horizons tests are 
estimated. 
13 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
As can be seen in tables 3 and 4 the accuracy of the forecasts displays a peculiar pattern 
for the GDP forecasts, at odds with the constant increase in forecast accuracy required for 
rationality. The accuracy of the forecasts initially decI'eases from January to March, 
where they are the most inaccurate, then become increasingly more accurate from April 
until September, with large increases in accuracy in August (45%), June (36%) and May 
(29%). Then, after a very slight decrease in accuracy in October, they reach their most 
accurate period in November. 
The inflation forecasts on the other hand show full rationality with the use of information. 
The forecasts become continuously better as the forecast horizon declines, and although it 
is a monotonic increase it is far from being smooth. There are large increases in accuracy 
in October (83%), November (60%), September (59%) and August (42%). Nevertheless, 
the inflation forecasts' accuracy is monotonically increasing as the forecast horizon 
declines, suggesting that the mean inflation forecasts make full and rational use of all 
available information. A possible contributing factor is that, in contrast to the information 
available on GDP, infornlation releases on inflation are frequent: figures for previous 
months' intlation rates are available the very following month for use by forecasters. 
International evidence of the accuracy of revisions is mixed. Swidler and Ketcher (1990) 
test forecasts of growth in real US GDP from 1976 to 1988 for horizons of one to eleven 
months and find that the forecasts improve monotonically as the horizon declines. In 
contrast, Kolb and Steckler (1990), testing a single major forecaster of US GNP growth 
from 1972 to 1983, find an overall increase in accuracy but with periods of decreasing 
accuracy. eho (2002), in contrast, finds that revisions to forecasts of US GDP growth do 
not improve in accuracy significantly at all. 
In summary, although both GOP and inflation forecasts become more accurate as the 
forecast horizon declines only the intlation forecasts exhibit rational use of available 
infonnation. The lack of full rational use of all available infornlation in the GOP 
forecasts implies that there is possibly some room for improvement in the accuracy of 
them. 
4.4 Relative Accuracy of the Consensus Forecast to Simple Forecasts: NaIve and 
Trend Forecast Alternatives 
While the MSE measure gives an indication of the how the accuracy of the mean 
forecasts behaves over the different horizons, it does not allow us to evaluate the 
accuracy of the mean forecast by itself. In order to do so one can compare the mean 
forecast with that of other forecasts. Here, the consensus forecast is compared to two 
momentum models, where the only information used to generate them are their past, 
publicly known values. 
The first extrapolation forecast that the consensus forecast is compared against is a naIve 
forecast, where the expected future value of the relevant variable is equal to its value the 
previous year. The second comparative extrapolation series is a trend forecast that has as 
its forecast a moving three-year average of the past values of the series being forecasted. 
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A key problem when evaluating both of these constructed series against the consensus 
forecast is that the consensus forecast has the advantage of increasing information as the 
forecast horizon declines, information that it incorporates with each of its revisions. The 
two extrapolation series are thus heavily penalised when evaluating their forecasting 
ability over the full year horizon compared to that of the consensus forecast as they are 
not revised to include any new relevant information. Useful inferences about comparative 
forecasting ability can therefore only really be made about the initial forecasts at the 
beginning of the forecast period. 
To address this problem and provide for a better evaluation of the consensus forecasts 
record over the full horizon, each of the two series were augmented with a simple 
learning revision to incorporate new information, but done so in a way to keep them both 
as simple models. 
The learning heuristic is based on the fact that, as the forecast horizon declines, part of 
the forecast variable becomes known with certainty and as such the amount of the 
variable that needs to be forecast declines. For example, when forecasting the inflation 
figures (which are an average for the full year) in January the entire figure is unknown 
and needs to be forecasted, but by February only l111ihs of its value is unknown and 
needs to be forecasted, January's inflation rate (ll1th of the full years average value) 
having been publicly released before the revised forecasts are submitted. By November, 
only one twelfth of the years' inflation rate is unknown and needs to be forecasted, the 
inflation rate for each of the previous eleven months is already publicly known with 
complete certainty. 
Based on this principle, both the nalve and trend forecasts are revised each month by 
including the information known about their forecast variable that is available at that 
time, and leaving the rest as the naiVe/trend forecast. The na'ive forecast of inflation in 
March 2004, for example, is constructed by adding the previous full year's inflation 
figure (weighted by 10112) to the released int1ation figures for February 2004 (weighted 
by 1112) and January 2004 (weighted by 1112). Importantly, the monthly releases of 
inflation figures allow the naIve and trend inflation forecasts to be updated each month. 
Quarterly GDP figures are released just before the revised forecasts in May (1 st quarter), 
August (2nd quarter) and November (3 rd Quarter)5, and as such the simple GDP forecasts 
can only be revised three times. The naIve forecasts of GDP for May 2004, for example, 
are the summation of the previous years GDP figure (weighted 3/4) and the GDP for the 
first quarter (weighted 114). GDP forecasts made before the May release are completely 
naIve, and forecasts made between GDP quarterly releases stay as the previous revised 
figure. June and July, for instance, have the same value as their forecasts as May, as they 
are made before the August release of the second quarter GDP figures. 
5 Importantly, both series are augmented using the unrevised figures, continuing the rule of using only the 
infonnation known at that specific time. 
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Theil's (1996) U-Statistic was used to evaluate the forecasting record of the mean 
forecast against that of the two augmented simple extrapolation forecasts; it is by far the 
most frequently used measure of comparison between two forecasts. Theil's U-Statistic 
is defined as: 
U
T 
= ~L(FT-I,T -Ar)2 
~L(E * T-I,T -AT f'. (6) 
Here, Theil's U-Statistic evaluates the mean forecast at each period against the relevant 
revised extrapolation forecast, E*. A U-statistic of less than 1 would imply that the mean 
forecast is a more accurate predictor of the actual than the simple extrapolation; a value 
of greater than 1 would imply that the opposite was true. Stated differently, aU-statistic 
of greater than one would imply that there was no value added by the information 
provided by the forecasters. Theil's U was estimated for both the inflation and GDP 
forecasts, comparing the revised trend and naIve forecasts to the consensus forecast over 
both the forecast horizon and for individual years. The results are given in tables 5 and 6, 
below. 
TABLE 5: Relative Accuracy of the Consensus forecast to Extrapolation forecasts, 
B H . 5y Oflzon 
GDP Inflation 
Naive Trend Naive Trend 
January 0.707 0.462 0.927 0.640 
February 0.718 0.470 0.895 0.638 
March 0.738 0.483 0.728 0.533 
April 0.727 0.476 0.691 0.521 
May 0.622 0.421 0.676 0.526 
June 0.502 0.340 0.633 0.508 
July 0.434 0.294 0.523 0.436 
August 0.361 0.278 OA12 0.395 
September 0.334 0.257 0.311 0.271 
October 0.344 0.265 0.151 0.134 
November 0.212 0.193 0.098 0.101 
Over the full forecast horizon (Table 5, above) the mean consensus forecast is 
consistently better than both the naIve and the trend forecasts for both GDP and inflation. 
Between the two extrapolation series, the naIve forecasts are, in general, more accurate 
than the trend forecasts. Importantly, both are relatively more accurate at long horizons 
than short. The naIve forecast in January for inflation, particularly, is almost as accurate 
as the consensus forecast, while it becomes a very poor forecast by November. This 
general decline in relative accuracy as the horizon declines implies that forecasters are 
utilising more information when making their forecasts than only the past known values 
of the relevant variable concerned. 
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Looking at the relative forecast accuracy for particular years (Table 6, below), the pattern 
is very different. The naIve forecast of GDP is more accurate than the consensus forecasts 
in 1996, and both the trend and the naIve forecasts are relatively more accurate in 2001 
and 2002. For the inflation forecasts, the naIve forecasts of inflation are better in 1994 
and substantially better in 1995, and the trend forecasts better in 2001. In 1998 both 
extrapolation series are relatively more accurate than the consensus forecasts. 
Conversely, in 1997, 1999 and 2000 the consensus forecast is far more accurate than both 
the naIve and the trend for both variables. 
Comparatively, although no single forecast is always the most accurate, in general the 
consensus forecasts can be said to be the most accurate, the naIve forecasts the second 
most accurate and the trend forecasts the least accurate of the three. Users of mean 
forecasts are thus justified in using them as they provide relevant additional information 
on the future value of the respective variable. 
TABLE 6: Relative Accuracy of the Consensus forecast to Extrapolation forecasts, 
B Y iy ear 
GDP Inflation 
Naive Trend NaIve Trend 
1994 0.213 0.l35 1.849 0.388 
1995 0.432 0.l87 2.461 0.850 
1996 1.247 0.489 0.413 0.321 
1997 0.446 0.525 0.313 0.723 
1998 0.983 0.636 1.120 1.383 
1999 0.446 0.531 0.453 0.363 
2000 0.154 0.l41 0.735 0.649 
2001 l.188 1.389 1.456 0.936 
2002 1.137 1.112 0.525 0.502 
4.5 Degree of Forecast 'Consensus' and Relative Accuracy 
A useful additional question regarding the mean forecasts is whether meaningful 
information can be gained about the accuracy of the mean forecast fi'om the level of 
dispersion of the forecasts around it. A greater 'consensus' amongst the forecasters (i.e. 
less dispersed forecasts) should imply less uncertainty around the variable being 
forecasted, and hence possibly a greater probability of it being more accurate, whereas 
less 'consensus' around the forecast value should be associated with more uncertainty 
and hence less accuracy. Stated differently, does a tight grouping of forecasts provide 
evidence of a more accurate mean forecast, and a large dispersion of the forecasts 
evidence of a poor mean forecast? If such a relationship exists, users of forecasts could 
employ the level of agreement of the forecasts as a guide to how much confidence to put 
into the mean forecast. 
17 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
This relationship was tested by looking at the relationship between the absolute error of 
the forecasts and the variance of the economists' forecasts for each period, specifically: 
(7) 
A problem is that both the forecast accuracy and the dispersion are affected by the 
forecast horizon; both of them declining as the year progresses. As such, the association 
can only be tested within each horizon separately. 
The variance-accuracy relationship of the forecasts was examined in two ways. Firstly, 
simple correlations between the absolute error of the forecasts and the variance amongst 
the forecasters at that period were calculated for each horizon. Secondly, to address the 
problem that strong isolated correlations in one year might distort the overall results, 
Spearman's Rank correlations were also calculated for each horizon. In both cases the 
correlations would be expected to be positive, as greater agreement would be expected to 
imply greater accuracy. Both figures are shown for all horizons in table 7 below. 
TABLE 7: Spearman's Rank Correlation and Normal Correlation between the 
Variance and Accuracv of Per Horizon Forecasts 
GDP Intlation ~i 
I Horizon, T-t Spearman's Correlation Spearman's Corr RankR 
I January, 11 0.00 
I February, 10 -0.16 
March,9 -0.03 
April, 8 -0.06 
II May, 7 0.29 
June, 6 0.34 
July,S 0.38 
August, 4 0.27 
September, 3 0.29 
October, 2 0.49 
November, 1 0.70 
NI 
n* significant at the 1% level 
** significant at the 5% level 
* significant at the 10% level 
r RankR r 
-0.13 0.26 0.43 
-0.15 0.33 0.67* 
0.08 0.40 0.76* 
-0.05 0.55 0.69* 
0.11 0.26 0.53 
0.55 0.37 0.57 
0.25 0.36 0.35 
0.24 0.41 0.46 
0.29 0.23 0.62 
0.48 0.56 -0.09 
.•...•... 
0.58 0.51 -0.04 
It appears that, in general, no meaningful infonnation regarding a forecasts' accuracy can 
be gained from examining the dispersion of the forecasts for GDP. Firstly, no pattern of 
the direction of the relationship between the two emerges. Secondly, the correlations 
between them are not significant for all horizons except the very last forecast period 
(November). Its positive values of 0.70 and 0.58 imply that a large agreement amongst 
the forecasters in November is an indication of a relatively more accurate November 
forecast than if there was a large dispersion of the forecasts that month. Unfortunately, 
not only is the relationship relatively weak, but it is right at the end of the forecast period 
and as such this finding is of very limited service to the users of forecasts. 
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The inflation forecasts also do not appear to be generally more accurate if there is more 
agreement about its future value. Only in February, March and April is there a significant 
relationship, but this is only implied in the simple correlations and not the Spearman's R. 
As such, the correlations cannot be said to provide tangible evidence of a relationship 
even for these few months for the inflation forecasts. 
This pattern of no general link between dispersion and accuracy was also found by 
Swidler and Ketcher (1990) in US GDP forecasts using similar methodology. They found 
that only forecasts made at a horizon of six months had a positive correlation with the 
degree of agreement and level of accuracy, with none of the other months showing any 
pattern or significance. 
5. Concluding Comments 
This paper used the Beeld/Stellenbosch GSB Economist of the Year competition 
forecasts to test various aspects of the average value of the forecasts of various 
forecasters. When forecasters make repeated revised forecasts of future GDP and 
inflation figures, their revised forecasts tend to converge on each other as the forecast 
horizon declines. It could therefore be argued that the mean forecast thus represents an 
increasingly appropriate summary of the information held by the individual forecasts. 
While both the consensus forecasts of GDP and Inflation forecasts are found to be 
rational overall, there is evidence that the mean forecast under-predicts historically large 
values and over-predicts historically small values of both variables at long forecast 
horizons, and does the opposite at short horizons. If forecasters expect a relatively high 
inflation or GDP growth figure early on in the year by historical standards, users of such 
forecasts should therefore view them as being probably too low, and if the initial forecast 
values of inflation and GDP growth are historically low forecast users should view them 
as being probably too high. In the latter part of the year, users of mean forecasts should 
view historically high forecasts are probably being too high, and historically low figures 
as being too low. 
Overall the mean forecast is observed to become increasingly more accurate as the 
forecast horizon declines, so forecasts at large horizons cannot be relied upon as much 
forecasts at short horizons. Lastly, there appears to be no relationship between the level 
of consensus around a certain forecast value and its accuracy. Users of forecasts cannot 
interpret strong agreement around a certain value as being indicative of a more accurate 
forecast than if there was less agreement around it. The mean forecast generated from a 
sample of widely dispersed forecasts appears to be no less accurate as a mean forecast 
generated from a highly concentrated field of forecast values. 
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